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Professional Service Organizations:
A Critique of the Literature
BORIS I. BITTKER 0
I N the seven years that have passed since the states began to
authorize doctors, lawyers, and other professional practitioners to
organize "professional corporations" and "professional associa-
tions," the status of these new-style groups under the Internal
Revenue Code has been the subject of a vast polemicalliterature.1
"BORIS I. BlTTKER. (B.A., Cornell Uni'rersity, 1938; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1941)
is a member of the Connecticut and New York Bars and Southmayd Professor of Law,
Yale Law SchooL
1 More than 100 items are listed by the ABA Professional Corporations Committee in
its 10 page Bibliography of Materials Relating to Tax Status of Professional Corpora-
tio'll8 (July, 1967). A more selective list would include: Anderson, Tax Aspects of
Professioncil Corporations, u. So. CALIF. 1963 TAX lUST. 309 (with bihliography);
Grayek, Professional Associations ana the Kintner Regulations: Some AnstrCTs, More
Questio'll8, and Further Comments, 17 TAX L. :REV. 469 (1962); Eaton, Professfonal
Corporations and Associations, 23 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1967); Mow, Professfonal Associations
and Professional Corporations, 16 Sw. L.J. 462 (1962); Scallen, Feilcral Income Taza·
tion of Professi(Jnal Associations and Corporations, 49 Mum. L. :REV. 603 (1965);
Snyder & Weckstein, QIWSi-Corporations, Quasi-Employees ana Quasi--Ta:c Belief for
Professional Persons, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 613 (1963); Note, Professional Corporations and
AS80ciatio'll8, 75 lIARv. L. REV. 776 (1962); Sarner, Associations Tazablc as Corpora-
tions: A .Review and a Loo]; Ahead, PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVEIlSITY TWE::TIETR
.ANNuAL INsTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 609 (1962). Since my obEen-ations relate
to the entire body of discussion, references hereafter to specific articles are intended na
illustrative only.
My own views on the classification of new-style professionnI organization laros are
to be found in Bittker, Professi(Jnal Associations ana F£ilcraZ Inrome Tazotion: Somo
Questions and Comments, 17 TAX L. REV. 1 (1961). In 1I. 1963 letter to Congre3SDlan
Wilbur D. :Mills, Congressman Charles L. Welmer said that it ' ..na his "understanding
that the manuscript of Professor Bittker's article was 'cleared' with the people in tho
Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department before it was publislJed and.
further that the article was published for the purpose of e:qJressing, through Professor
Bittker, the Internal :Revenue Service and Treasury Department news • • ••" Because
this characterization of my article has been accepted at face vnIue, or at least repeated,
by others, I should like to conect the record: I had no information whatsoever, from
either official or unofficial sources, that my views coincided with, influenced, or cnused
a ebange in the neros of anyone in the Internal :Revenue Service or Tre:lSury unW long
after the article was pUblished. This was when, a )'enr or more after its publicntion,
while on a year's sabbatical leave in Italy, I received lI. newspaper clipping asserting
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With few exceptions, the commentators have been sympathetic to
the view that professional service organizations are "corpora-
tions" as that term is defined by section 7701 (a)(3) of the Oode;
but the reasons offered by those who espouse this view are diverse
and contradictory_ The only conclusion that they share-their least
common denominator, so to speak-is that some professional
groups, organized under some state laws, should, under some cir-
cumstances, be classified as corporations in applying the Internal
that government officials, in expressing doubts about the corporate status clalmoll for
professional groups organized under new-style statutes, were citing tho articlo. I do not
know whether, if this report was true, my article merely buttressed their indepondont
views or convinced them to abandon an earlier contrary conviction. (Naturnlly, I would
prefer to think that, fighting all the way, they were reluctantly won over by the cogoney
of my arguments.) As to the allegcd advance ttclearance" of the article, before its
publication I sent a nearly final draft to a number of friends in private practice,
academic life, and the government. The government officials, as might have beon ex-
pected, responded with polite but noncommittal acknowledgements, accompanied by not
so much as a corrected citation; the other readers, however, offered a number of com-
ments, some of which led to minor revisions before publication.
In conversations with tax practitioners, I have detected much more skepticism about
the eorporate status of new-style professional organizations than is suggested by tho
published articles, as well as an undercurrent of uneasiness over tlle use of these arrange-
ments by lawyers, doctors, and other professional persons. If interests in a professionnl
corporation can be owned by nonemployees, the door may be open to tho snle of interests
to persons who, though members of the same profession, are acting as t t investors" rathor
than practitioners. For a fanciful inflation of this possibility, sce TlIe Da!l Law Firms
Went PubZic, 5 N.J.S.B.J. 865 (1962)-an item not included in the ABA bibliography.
In a more restrained but similarly entrepreneurial vein, an attorney oltce suggested to
me that he might use a professional corporation as a medium of solling, to otllOr at-
torneys, interests in his successful combination of law practice and real estate specu-
lation.
This uneasiness will be increased by O'Neill v. United States, 68-1 U.S.T.O. 11 0251
(N.D. Ohio 1968), decided after this article was in galley, holding that the Ohio profes.
sional associations law confers limited liability on the shareholders of an Ohio profes-
sional association because clients and patients can look only to the entit.y itself and to
the ttperson or persons who actually furnish the professional services" for rodress in
the event of malpraetice or other tortious conduct. (Emphasis ndded.) In my 1061 articlo
(Bittker, supra at 10-13), I suggested that such a construction of professional associa-
tion statutes would drastically alter the relationship between llLW firms and thoir clionts.
I should think that the American Bar Association's Committee on Professionnl Ethics
(and comparable bodies of other professional organizntions) would be concornod about
the possibility that a legal opinion rendered by an tt employee" of a professional assooin-
tion, inevitably deriving part of its authority from the professional reputation of all
t t shareholders" of the entity, would not impose personal liability on those who did not
tt actually furnish the professional services," as held in the O'Nem CRse. Undor Obio
law, this limitation on professional responsibility evidently exists oven 1£ tho client is
not informed of it. However, the canons of ethics require that Hrestrictions on liabllity
as to t other lawyers in the organization' must be made apparent to the cllont." See
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 303 (1961). Quaere: who is the It client"
when a professional opinion is rendered in a reorganization matter, public offoring of
stock, etc¥ If the It client" includes all those relying on such an opinion, how aro such
limitations on liability to be ttmade apparent" to them¥
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Revenue Code. This common core of agreement aside, the argu-
ments for treating new-style professional groups as corporations
clash with each other almost as sharply as with the Treasury's
contrary view, and they carry widely divergent implications for
both professional groups and other taxpayers. The attack on the
Treasury has been pressed with such vigor, however, as to obscure
both the intramural contradictions of the pro-corporation theories
and their radiating implications.
State Labels
To start with the most simplistic argument offered in support
of the "corporate" status of new-style professional organizations,
some commentators have asserted that an organization enjoying
the label "corporation" under state law must be so treated by the
Internal Revenue Service, whether it possesses the corporate
characteristics described in the llforrissey case 2 or not; and others
have flirted with this theory, without endorsing it wholeheartedly.
The theory is that section 7701(a) (3) was intended by Congress to
embrace any organization that is called a "corporation" by the
state under whose law it was created.
Although the partisans of this view seem to assume that the or-
ganization's state label is to be found in the statute governing its
creation and operation, we are not told why the label used by the
state in characterizing the organization for tax, regulatory, or
other purposes should not be equally efficacious-or even more so,
since as used in such statutes the label has practical consequences.
On this theory, a professional group would have to be treated as a
corporation under section 7701(a) (3) if, despite a neutral label
(e.g., "organization") in the state law authorizing its creation,
it was classified as a corporation by the state's corporate income or
franchise tax law. Moreover, if the state's label is to control, I per-
ceive no reason to distinguish between a state's use of the label
"corporation" and its use of the label "association." Both terms
appear in section 7701(a) (3), with nothing to indicate that one, but
not the other, refers to state usage. Thus, the supremacy-of-Iabels
theory would permit virtually all professional organizations to be
classified as corporations by reference to their label alone, since the
state statutes under examination almost always use either the term
"professional corporation" or the term "professional associa-
tion." A corollary of this conclusion is that an organization's clas-
sification would depend upon the criteria of the llforrissey case
2 Morrissey v. 00='r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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only if it were neither a corporation nor an association under state
law (e.g., a trust).8
Despite these radiating implications, the supremacy~of~labels
theory seems to be restricted by its advocates to state professional
corporation laws, with the result that they would require organiza~
tions created under professional association laws to make their
way under the Morrissey criteria. Since it is usually conceded or
assumed that a solo practitioner cannot qualify under these criteria
for want of associates, the supremacy~of-Iabels theory fails to
s Indeed, one might go further. If the terms "corporation" and /I association" ns
used in section 7701 (a) (3) take their content from state usnge, <lacs it not follow thnt
a state's failure to confer one of these labels on an organization effectively bars it from
qualifying as a corporation under section 7701 (a) (3)' One might, to bo sure, argue
that the state label is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition to corporate status
under section 7701 (a) (3); but I have seen nothing in the supremacy·of-Iabels theory to
explain why its efficacy should be so restricted, or why-assuming that stato labels aro
controlling-a state's use of the term "partnership" or /I joint venture" sltoull1 not
conclusively determine that the organization is a partnersllip within the meaning of
section 7701 (a) (2).
In Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), on appeal to tho Tenth
Circuit, holding the 1965 regulations invalid, the court rests heavily on the theory tllll.t
an "incorporated organization" must be classed as a "corporation" because scction
7701(11.) (2) defines the term "partnership" to include a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, "or other unincorporated organization." By itself, lLOwever, this appronch docs
not supply definitions for either "incorporated organization" or "unincorporatod organi.
zation"; and it is not clear whether the court regarded the professional group beforo it ns
, 'incorporated" because of its state label, its charter, or its corporate characteristics. Moro·
over, in its discussion of section 7701 (a) (2) and section 7701(11.) (3), tIle court left an un·
distributed middle: the term "partnership" as defined by section 7701(11.) (2) inoludcs
"unincorporated organizations," but it does not necessarily follow that section 7701 (a)
(2) does not also include incorporated organizations if they lacl, the requisito corporate
clillracteristics. It may have been these gaps in theory that led tho court to offor a
second ground for its decision, viz., that assuming arguendo tho validity of tho 1005
regulations, the professional group in question more nearly resembled Il. corporation than
a partnership. This ground weakens the value of the Empey caso as Il. precedent for
other taxpayers, both because the group was organized under Colorado's general busincss
corporation law and because the decision rests to some degree on an agreed statement
of facts describing the group's mode of operation in practice.
I do not know what to make of the ABA sponsored proposal (51 A.B.A.J. 403 (1005»
to amend section 7701(a)(3) to provide that the term "corporation" shall includo:
professional corporations and professional associations formed under tho law of
any state, the District of Columbia, or any United States possession.
Does the proposal embrace any organization that is calleil a professional corporation or
professional association by the state statute authorizing its formation, rogardless of
its legal characteristics' Or can an organization qualify only if its characteristics meet
an unspecified nationwide set of corporate or association criteria-without regard to
its state label' Since any organization, including a partnership, is formed " under tho
law" of some state, what purpose is served by this part of tbe definition' Docs it mean
"under the law of any state relating to professional corporations or professional as·
sociations'" If so, what are the identifying marks of such laws'
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reseue sueh doetors and lawyers in professional association states
from their "plight." 4 The theory's engaging simplicity is qualified
in another way by at least one of its supporters, who would disre-
gard the label if it is a " sham." [j This qualification throws the baby
out with the bathwater; the only way to determine if the label is a
sham is to see whether the organization has enough corporate char-
aeteristics to deserve the label
A variation on the label theory, whieh similarly promises to side-
step the Morrissey ease, asserts that the only distinguishing touch-
stone of a corporation is its charter. Inspired by the Dartmouth
College case, one commentator has put the case as follows:
Basic to this concept of a corporation [i.e., Chief Justice :\Iarshall's
view, as expressed in the Dartmouth OoUege case] is the granting of
a charter by the state or federal government which creates the entity
and which endows the entity with the power to act.
There is nothing in the present language of the Code whieh indieates
that Congress intended any other meaning to the term" corporation." 0
The import of the term" charter" is not self-evident, but it seems
to imply a grant of authority by the state, recorded in a public
office, to an organization that meets a set of standards or require-
ments. In this sense, one could say that limited partnerships
possess charters because they are formed by the execution of a
certificate, which must be filed in a designated public office. If this
doeument is not a eharter because, although accepted for recorda-
tion, its compliance with the statutory requirements is not attested
by the signature or seal of a public official, that formality could be
readily supplied-with no real-life consequences-by amending
the state's limited partnership act. .Although there is some differ-
ence in conclusiveness between the state's recordation of a limited
partnership's certificate and the issuance of a certificate of incor-
poration,7 it is important in only a few bizarre situations (where
~ It does, of course, tell them that if they can get their state legislatures to substitute
the word "corporation" for "association" in the applienble state laws, they too
will enjoy the magic label.
15 Seallen, Federal, Income Taxation of ProfessionaZ .cf.ssociations and CorporaticfnS,
49 MmN. L. REV. 603, 696, 708 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Scnllen].
6 Anderson, Taz .cf.spects Of Professional, Corporations, U. So. OAL. 1963 TAX Il:ST.
309, 318. At times, Anderson comes close to contending that the touchstone of (l. corpom·
tion is the fact that it is an arti1icial entity (the need for (l. eharter nrising becausl3 the
form of organization was not known. to the common law). I am not sure how he would
respond to the fact that limited partnerships, like corporations, are Clro.tures of statute,
not recognized by the common law. See Ruziekn. v. R3ger, 305 N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.~d 878
(1953); State v. Williams, 196 Kan. 274, 411 P.2d 591 (1966).
'1 Compare § 2, Uniform Limited Partnership Act, with §§ 49-50, :Model :Business
Corporation Act.
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the formalities have been disregarded by the parties, or their at-
torneys) ; and a limited partnership's certificate could, without ad-
verse results for anyone, be endowed with the same dignity as a
certificate of incorporation. And if this step would enable limited
partnerships to be taxed as corporations, I see no reason why
ordinary partnerships should not be tricked out with charters by
a similar stroke of the statutory pen. (Indeed, why would it not be
equally possible for a state to grant charters to wage-earners, thus
launching us on an era of "proletarian corporations" 7) 8 If, on the
other hand, a certificate of organization cannot constitute a charter
unless the organization's legal characteristics conform to those of
a corporation, the claim that a charter is the distinguishing mark
of corporate status is misleading, and ought to be abandoned, be-
cause it is only a roundabout way of embarking us on the familiar
search for corporate characteristics.
The Insights of Realism
Another prominent theme in the debate on new-style professional
organizations is the diminished importance of the traditional
characteristics of the corporation, viz., centralized management,
free transferability of shares, continuity of existence, and limited
liability. Sometimes this point is the prelude to a contention that
closely held business corporations, when viewed realistically, are
not much different from partnerships, an insight leading in turn to
the suggestion that professional organizations should be classified
as corporations under section 7701(a) (3) if they resemble closely-
held corporations in practice, even if their possession of the ortho-
dox corporate characteristics is debatable. Sometimes, on the other
hand, the issue is approached from the point of view of the large
partnership, the argument being that such organizations in practice
often resemble corporations. In either case, we are asked to be
"realistic" rather than"conceptual."
A realistic view undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that many
closely held business corporations do not want centralized manage-
ment or free transferability and hence often arrange to modify or
nullify these corporate characteristics by charter provisions, by-
laws, or shareholders' agreements. As to continuity of existence, it
may be an irrelevant feature, or even a shortcoming to be redressed
8For "proletarian eorporations," which might bring us closer to the Peoplo's Oap·
italism that is envisioned by the New York Stock Exchange, seo Bittkor, Profcssirmal
Assooiatwns ana FederaZ Income Taa:ation: Some Qlt6stwns and Comments, 17 TAX
L. REV. 1, 34, (1961).
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by an agreement for a liquidation at a specified time or on the
demand of any major shareholder. The fourth item on the tradi-
tional list of corporate characteristics-limited liability.-may be
inconsequential as respects tort claims because the enterprise is
fully insured, and negated as to contract claims by a business
practice of requiring shareholders to guarantee performance of
the corporation's major undertakings.
Having pointed out these undeniable facts of life, the partisans
of the professional service organization then argue that it is naive,
finicky, or reactionary to fault the new-style state laws for watering
down the traditional corporate characteristics that most closely
held enterprises do not need in pure form anyway. It should be
enough, they seem to argue, if the state law makes some gestures in
the "right" direction. Since ordinary closely held corporations
often takes steps to qualify or restrict the pristine corporate char-
acteristics with which they are endowed by their creator, we should
not cavil if the state itself imposes comparable restrictions on the
professional organization at its inception, rather than conferring
full-blown corporate characteristics on it and leaving any modifica-
tions to the unfettered choice of its members.D
The same conclusion is sometimes reached by another route. In-
stead of comparing the characteristics of the professional organiza-
tion under examination with those possessed by an ordinary
corporation at the time of its organization, we are told to see if it
resembles the closely held corporation in operation-i.e., after the
naked provisions of the latter's charter have been altered by its
bylaws, shareholder's agreement, and, possibly, practice. Corporate
characteristics, in this view, should not be defined as they are in
the black-letter generalizations of a conceptual treatise, but as il-
luminated by practice. Thus, since it is not unusual for ordinary
closely held corporations to prohibit the transfer of stock to per-
sons who are not active employees, a similar restriction imposed
by law on a professional organization is not-it is argued-incon-
9 Seallen at 683: CCcentralization of mnnngement is a Bhnky bllSis for clnssifying
professional or any other groups for t3.X purposes • • • ." CCThe relevance of trnnsfcr-
ability to corporateness is doubtful today ••••" Id. at 688. It [O]ontinuity [of life]
appears at the most a rather minor technicnl chnrneteristic, if relevant nt nll" Id. at
677. When Seallen adds to these comments the observation thnt limitcd linbility-
C C[P]erhaps in most cases ••• the only criterion of corporateness that has any prncticnl
significance, " id. at 687-is not essential to corporate status, one 'wonders ,..hat Is
controlling, in his view, if not the label. :But he also cautions ngninst shnm Inbels, with·
out saying which, if any, of the foregoing trivialities (ns he sccs them) must be present
to insure that the label is valid.
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sistent with the corporate characteristic of free transferability of
interests.
Although a rejection of these "realistic" appeals opens one
to the charge of naivete or invincible ignorance, I do not think that
the "practical" view of the closely held enterprise contributes
very much to the problem at hand. To begin with, this approach
would almost certainly require the rejection of centralized manage-
ment as a corporate characteristic, since by shareholder agreement,
many closely held corporations substitute unanimity for repre-
sentative control. Continuity of existence as a corporate character-
istic, with its implication that the corporation is unaffected by the
death or other personal exigencies of a shareholder, would evi-
dently take on a new meaning in view of the common practice of
requiring a closely held corporation to purchase the stock of a
shareholder on his death, termination of employment, etc. Free
transferability would also have a more confined meaning if this
approach were to be followed. Limited liability is the only tradi-
tional corporate characteristic that would be unscathed by the acid
of realism, though if business practice (including on the one hand
the availability of liability insurance and on the other, the banldng
custom of requiring shareholders of small corporations to guar-
antee payment of corporate loans) is to be taken into account, the
boundaries of limited liability would also be truncated. None of
these qualifications is adumbrated, let alone endorsed, by the exten-
sive case law on the meaning of section 7701(a)(3), nor does its
legislative history imply a realistic rather than conceptual compari-
son of the traditional characteristics of a corporation with the
characteristics of the organization under examination.
If business organizations are to be classified in realistic rather
than conceptual terms, moreover, many large partnerships-to
their chagrin-would be taxable as corporations, without any aid
from the new-style professional organization laws that have stimu-
lated the new wave of legal realism. As stated above, the realistic
view of the traditional corporate characteristics is sometimes em-
ployed to establish that a large partnership, in practice, may re-
semble a corporation: despite the theory that each partner is an
agent for all, a large partnership may be managed exclusively by
a committee or managing partner; despite the theoretical nontrans-
ferability of interests, the partnership agreement may permit
transfers; and despite the theoretical dissolution on the death,
bankruptcy, or withdrawal of anyone partner, the agreement may
provide for a continuation of the business.
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From a practical point of view, there is much to be said for the
view that such organizations resemble corporations. Before this
view is embraced as a proper interpretation of section 7701(a) (3),
however, any of its proponents who are members of large law and
accounting firms ought to ask how they would respond if the In-
ternal Revenue Service taxed their organizations as associations
for all open tax years. I suspect that their briefs, beating a hasty
retreat from "realism," would assert that there is a world of dif-
ference between a large law firm's partnership agreement and a
closely held corporation's charter-and that no matter how wide-
spread the practice of modifying corporate charters by share-
holders' agreements may be, the two forms of business organization
must be treated differently for federal income tax purposes. One
might, of course, reject this predictable flight into conceptualism
on the ground that the authors' law review articles are more per-
suasive than their self-serving briefs. I would subscribe, on the
contrary, to the more conservative view that section 7701(a) (3)
looks to the traditional characteristics of corporations in determin-
ing whether an organization is an association; and that it is the
perquisite of Congress, not the Internal Revenue Service or the
courts, to decide whether, and how much, section 7701(a) (3) should
be infused with this brand of realism.
Moreover, acceptance of the "realistic" approach to corporate
characteristics, even if it could somehow be confined to professional
organizations, would require us to resolve a latent disagreement
among its proponents, viz., should realism stop with an examina-
tion of the documents governing the professional organization's
conduct, or embrace their impact in practice as wellYIf two lawyers
create a professional association under a statute providing for
centralized management, continuity of interest, and transferability
of shares, does a realistic assessment of their arrangement lend to
the conclusion that it is a corporation because a two-man business
corporation will be treated as a corporation even if its corporate
characteristics are attentuated or nullified by agreement ~ Or does
realism require us to disregard the formal characteristics of the
two-man professional organization, and classify it by reference to
its behavior in real life7 An affirmative answer to the latter ques-
tion is implied by the frequency with which" realists" appeal to the
undeniable fact that some large partnerships are controlled by
management committees, permit interests to be transferred, and
continue despite the death of individual partners. If the status of
a professional organization is to be decided in the light of realism,
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then the brand of realism to be applied will determine whether it
qualifies as a corporation or not.
Tax Equality
Another major theme in the professional organization literature
is tax equality: Professional persons who cannot incorporate under
orthodox state laws are at an unfair disadvantage, it is argued,
when compared with other taxpayers. The complaint of inequality
is based almost wholly on the fact that one must be an employee
to participate in a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan. Since
the owner of an individual business proprietorship can convert
himself into a shareholder-employee of a one-man corporation, it
it argued that an attorney or physician who is prevented by pro-
fessional ethics (or other rules) from taking a similar step is the
victim of tax discrimination.
This argument was, of course, an important element in the long
campaign that culminated in the enactment of the Self-Employed
Individuals Retirement Act of 1962:
The primary reason for the [proposed legislation] is to give self-
employed persons access to retirement plans on a reasonably similar
basis to that accorded corporate stockholder employees. It thus tends to
correct a discrimination in present law under which self-employed in-
dividuals-sole proprietors and partners-are prevented from partici-
pating in retirement plans established for the benefit of their employees
although owner-managers of corporations may do so. Self-employed
individuals have contended for many years they are treated unfairly
under present law.
. . . In many cases, self-employed individuals are prohibited by State
law from operating their trade or business in the form of a corporation.
Thus, in these cases, there is no possibility that a self-employed person
could obtain the benefits of a retirement plan under existing law by
forming a corporation to conduct his trade or business and becoming
its employee. Although a number of States recently have enacted new
new legislation to eliminate some of the obstacles to professional cor-
porations and associations, your committee believes it desirable to
provide by Federal legislation that a self-employed individual may
participate in employee retirement plans without becoming an artificial
employee of his own corporation. Thus, professional individuals could
continue to practice their profession in the traditional manner; that is,
as self-employed individuals. Moreover, this legislation would ease the
pressure on State legislatures to enact special professional corporation
laws.10
10 S. REP. No. 992, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1961), reprinted at 1962-3 CUM. BULL.
310-11.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 23 Tax L. Rev. 439 1967-1968
1968] PROFESSIONAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS 439
Despite the 1962 legislation, the complaint of discrimination has
continued, but in modified form: post-1962 discrimination is seen
in the fact that self-employed persons who are permitted by state
law to incorporate can now choose between a self-employed re-
tirement plan and a qualified employee plan, while physicians,
attorneys, and some other professional groups can use only the
self-employment route. Because employee plans have certain ad-
vantages over self-employed plans, we are told that professionals
continue to be second class citizens.
It is of course true that the disparity between those who can
incorporate and those who cannot has not been wholly eliminated,
but the gap has been narrowed by the 1962legislationP Moreover,
the character of discrimination depends on the groups being com-
pared. As compared with self-employed persons who are free to
incorporate, professionals seem to be the victims of discrimination.
When compared with other relevant groups however, they are the
beneficiaries of discrimination. I refer to the millions of employees
whose employers have not established qualified retirement plans,
as well as the additional millions of employees whose participation
in qualified plans is an illusion because their benefits will never
vest. Like attorneys and physicians, these taxpayers provide per-
sonal services for compensation-but being employees, they cannot
establish self-employed retirement plans. From their point of view,
therefore, attorneys and physicians have been since 1962 the bene-
ficiaries of discrimination, and the discrirnininatory distance be-
tween these groups will be enlarged if professional corporations
are recognized for tax purposes.
Whatever decision Congress might choose to make in these cir-
cumstances, it would be inappropriate for a court-faced with the
debatable issue of the validity of a new-style professional organiza-
tion law-to be swayed by the argument that professionals are, on
balance, the victims of tax discrimination. As suggested, this argu-
ment is tenable only if one accepts the unarticulated major premise
that selj-ernploynzent is the critical test of discrimination, so that
physicians, attorneys, and other professionals "belong" with those
businessmen who can readily incorporate. If one assumes, to the
contrary, that they "belong" with persons who purvey personal
services, most of whom are employees and have no opportunity to
establish qualified retirement plans, they are not the victims of
11 The 1962 legislation for self-employed retirement plnns was libernlized in 191iG b;r
the repeal of section 404(a) (10) and an amendment of section 401(c) (2).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 23 Tax L. Rev. 440 1967-1968
440 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:
discrimination.12 There are times when a court cannot make any
contribution to the over-all rationality of the legal structure from
which an issue has emerged for judicial determination; on such
occasions, a modest, albeit old-fashioned, view of the judicial func-
tion-deciding cases, not doing justice-should prevail.
In any event, those who believe that new-style professional
groups should be taxed as corporations offer reasons that differ
widely in their impact on the equality issue. If the state label is
controlling, equality can be achieved by all professional practi-
tioners in states that are willing to confer the corporate label. If
realism is controlling, sOple practitioners will achieve equality but
others will not. If solo practitioners cannot qualify for corporate
status (as some commentators believe), they will be left in outer
darkness everywhere. Other divergencies in the views of the pro-
corporation commentators will have similarly discriminatory
consequences within the professions, the nature and extent of the
discrimination being dependent upon the ability of diverse profes-
sional organizations to qualify as corporations under the divergent
theories offered by these commentators.
Solo Practitioners
Responding to skepticism about the feasibility of centralized
management, free transferability of interests, and continuity of
existence in the case of professional practice, the supporters of
professional organization statutes point to group practice medical
clinics and large law firms as proof that a professional organiza-
tion may possess these corporate characteristics. This refutation,
however, puts its proponents in a dilemma. If their premise is that
group practice of the type described is typical of the professions,
they find themselves face-to-face with the undeniable fact that
12 An alternative, more refined statement would be: Of those persons who purvoy
personal services, some (physicians, attorneys, etc.) can establish retirement plnns under
n.R. 10, others (plumbers, etc.) have a choice between n. R. 10 and incorporation, and
still others can participate in a private retirement plan only if their employors chooso
to establish one. Some of the latter have enough leverage (by virtuo of special occupa·
tional talents, collective bargaining, etc.) to exert pressure on their employers; otllOrs
lack such leverage, and have only the power to quit the job and look for another if
they want to be covered by a private retirement plan. Even these persons have a choice
between covered and uncovered employment (and between employment and self·em·
ployment), but in this sense, physicians and attorneys also can control their fate by turning
from self-employment to salaried jobs.
It is surprising that advocates of tax equality have not climbed on the "proletarian
corporation" bandwagon, see note 8 S1lpra, since it would enable all purveyors of personnl
services-practicing lawyers, law professors, bank clerks, drapers' assistants, etc.-to
create their own qualified pension plans.
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medical and legal practice in the United States is now, and for
some time to come is likely to be, heavily dominated by solo practi-
tioners (including, in the case of attorneys, small aggregations
that may call themselves partnerships but that share only rental,
secretarial, and research expenses, not their fees). If, on the other
hand, the premise is that group practice (though not typical) is
possible~ it seems to imply that only a small fraction of practi-
tioners would qualify for corporate treatment even under the new-
style statutes, because they are the only ones who could realistically
claim to be governed by the corporate characteristics allegedly
conferred by these statutes.13
This implication is reinforced by the caution or reserve with
which many commentators, so positive in most of their assertions,
confront the status of the solo practitioner under the new-style
statutes. If the state law calls itself a "professional association"
statute, it is often admitted, explicitly or implicity, that the solo
practitioner's lack of associates prevents him from qualifying as an
association under section 7701(a) (3). If the law uses the label "pro-
fessional corporation," a few commentators (especially those who
argue that labels are controlling) assert that the solo professional
practitioner is as much entitled to corporate treatment as the one-
man business enterprise organized under a conventional corpora-
tion statute; but most seem uneasy with this comparison, express-
ing or implying doubts about the solo practitioner's right to be
taxed in accordance with the state label.
This caution is quite commendable, in my opinion; but the sup-
porters of the new-style statutes must find it galling, since it blights
any hope these statutes will correct the tax inequality that they
perceive in existing law. The most that can be claimed, in these
circumstances, is that large firms may be able to qualify for cor-
porate tax treatment, leaving most practitioners with H.R. 10 as
their only vehicle for tax reduction. If the new statutes should
prove to be efficacious for large professional firms, but not for the
solo practitioner (or for his indistinguishable colleague, the' 'part-
ner" who shares his expenses but not his income with other practi-
13 Group medical practice is constantly cited to establish thnt largo aggregations are
now typical of the organization of medical care in the United States. The oldtimo doctor
with a black bag full of pills is hard to find today, but not because medical practice is
dominated by groups like the Mayo Clinic. The U.S. Public Health Serrlce hns estimnted
that, in 1959, only about 7 per cent of physicinns in private practice belonged to medical
groups-even though its definition of group practice required only 3 full·tima physicians.
Very few groups had more than a dozen physicinns, llI1d only n. hllIldful were compnroble
in size to large big-city law :firms. PUBLIO HEALTH SERVIOE PUBLIOM'IO!r No. 1003,
MEDICAL GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES, Table 6, at 12, Chart 7, at:lS (1903).
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tioners), a new distinction would be created within each profession,
and it would support the thesis that recognition of the new statutes
will heighten rather than reduce the "inequality" of existing law.
The Treasury Regulations
Although the proponents of new-style professional organizations
are unanimous in attacking the Treasury's 1965 regulations, their
harmony shatters when they turn to the pre-1965 regulations. Those
who regard the 1960 (UKintner") regulations as a proper in·
terpretation of section 7701(a)(3) must base their case for cor·
porate treatment on a four factor analysis of each new-style pro·
fessional organization, corporate status being attained only if it
possesses more corporate than noncorporate characteristics. (As
pointed out above, solo practitioners would be excluded for want
of associates, and there is disagreement on whether an organization
is to be subjected to the four factor analysis if it bears the state
label of corporation.) To some commentators, however, the Treas·
ury's 1960 regulations are no more acceptable than the 1965 vel'·
sion; for them, the claim to legitimacy is lodged in an earlier
generation of regulations.14 This denial of authenticity to the 1960
regulations is based partly on a procedural contention (viz., that
the Treasury did not have the power to alter the pre-1960 regula.
tions because they had been frozen into law by congressional reM
enactment of section 7701(a)(3) and by legislative acquiescence),
and partly on substantive grounds (viz., that the four factor
analysis of the 1960 regulations was erroneous, along with its reM
quirement that more characteristics be corporate than noncor·
porate to qualify for corporate status).
Rejection of the 1960 regulations, however, creates as many
problems as it solves. As with the Spanish and Austrian royal
families, it is not clear how far back we must go to find anybody
with a clear title to the public's allegiance. Is the crown to be
awarded to Regulations 33, issued under the Revenue Act of 1913,
14 This support for the pre-1960 regulations is not based on allY enthusiasm for thoir
content. Scallen says of the pre-Kintner regulations that their criteria woro not basod on
"practicality." Scallen at 716. Eaton is even harsher:
In the early evolution of regulations • • . the Treasury charted an orratic and
often dubious course. The language used was not clear; it changed ovor tho yoars;
and the so-called corporate characteristics from time to time mentioned in tho rogu.
lations were various instead of merely the two (limited liability and continulty of
life) stressed by Congress.
Eaton, Pro!essWnaZ Oorporations anil Associations, 23 TAX L. REV. I, 3 (1067).
Even so, it is argued that the regulations in one of their pre-l060 incarnations woro put,
by congressional acceptance, beyond the power of the Treasury to chango.
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which characterized limited partnerships as corporations ~ To
Regulations 45 (Revenue Act of 1918), which excluded limited
partnerships, but included' in the association category "[a]n
organization the membership interests in which are transferable
without the consent of all the members, however the transfer may
be otherwise restricted, and the business of which is conducted by
trustees or directors and officers without the active participation of
all the members as such" ~ To Regulations 86 (Revenue Act of
1934), stating that federal tax law "makes its own classifications
and prescribes its own standards of classification," and that
" [1] ocal law is of no importance in this connection" 1111 Or is the
only legitimate definition to be found in one of the other sets of
Regulations-65, 74, 77, 94, 101, 111, or 1031 16
Whether their search for regulations that will support the new-
style professional organization leads them all the way back to the
1913 bedrock, or only to a more recent pre-1960 level, our archaeo-
logical commentators are bound to undermine the foundations on
which other groups-real estate syndicates, theatrical ventures,
etc.-have been resting comfortably since 1960.n The choice of
pre-1960 regulations is relevant to professional groups as well,
not only because it would establish the criteria to be applied in
classifying new-style professional organizations, but also because
the standards found in the earliest rules might permit some pro-
fessionals to qualify for corporate status without resort to the
recently enacted statutes. Indeed, there are statements in some
early regulations that, taken at face value, would impose corporate
status on many professional groups even if they prefer to be taxed
as partnerships.
In short, the theory that an unspecified set of pre-1960 regula-
tions contains the authoritative interpretation of section 7701(3.)
(3), which only Congress has power to change, has been advanced
15 Although Scallen, at 661, 672, characterizes this statement M "ludkrous" and
"absurd," it may have been the ultimate reason why Kintner was decided for the
taxpayer, i.e., if "local law is of no importance," then one might Ol"erlool: the fact
that the Kintner clinic's bylaws were probably, at important points, unenforceable under
state law.
16 The history of the regulations is completely set out, with quotations and BUII1D1!lrie3,
in Seallen at 648-71.
11 See Lyons, Oomments on tIle New Regulations on .Associations, 16 TAX L.1b:V. 441
(1961); Sarner, .Associations Taxable as Oorporations: .A RCt;1ew and a Loo1: .i1.head.
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW' YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTIETH: A."nt"UAL InSTITUTE 0:1 FEDEnAL
TAXATION 609 (1962); Rustigan, Effect of Begulation Definitions on Beal Estate Syn-
dicates, PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY NINL'l'EEN'l'R AlmuAL I%rsTlTll'l'E 0::
FEDERAL TAXATION 1065 (1961).
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with surprisingly little attention to the proper place to stop. If you
unpeel enough of an artichoke, after all, you get to the inedible
choke itself. '
The Kintner Case
Supporters of the new-style professional organization laws are
lavish in their citations of the Kintner case/s which is offered as
proof that the Treasury's 1960 and 1965 regulations were plainly
wrong and that compliance with a new-style state statute entitles
an organization to corporate status.
If Kintner is as authoritative and convincing as these unqualified
endorsements imply, however, why did professional partnerships,
by and large, think that they needed H.R. 10 or a new-style state
law to establish qualified retirement plans 7 Why did the advisers
of all but a handful of professional partnerships hesitate to rely on
Kintned To be sure, in 1956 the Treasury indicated its nonacquie-
scence in Kintner (which was decided in 1954), and in 1960 it wrote
this rejection into the regulations.19 But there was a period of more
than a year between the decision and the 1956 ruling when tax-
payers might have been expected to act in droves on the strength
of Kintner if it were persuasive as its supporters now assert; and
similar massive reliance would have been natural between 1957,
when the government retreated somewhat from its 1956 ruling,20
and 1960, when the regulations were issued. After 1960, to be sure,
the new regulations would have been more of a deterrent to action
in reliance to Kintner; 21 but a tax adviser might have reckoned
that the regulations would cut little ice with the judiciary, es-
pecially given their forensic purpose, if he was as sure of his
ground as the latter-day apostles of Kintner claim to be.
The failure of more than a handful of taxpayers to rely on
Kintner is even more revealing when one notes how little the tax-
payer stood to lose if his challenge to the Treasury's position had
ultimately failed. Hundreds, if not thousands, of professional
groups have been organized under the new-style professional
organization laws despite the Treasury's adamant refusal to accept
their validity, the strategy being in large part that they have a
good deal to gain from victory and little to lose if they are un-
18 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); see also Galt v. United
States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
19 Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 598.
20 Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 886.
21 See Wolfman & Price, Q1J.Q,lifying Under Final Kintner :R1cles Will Be Difficult in
Most States, 14 J. TAXATION 105 (1961).
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successful. In this respect, the area is toto caelo different from
corporate reorganizations, stock redemptions, and some other
transactions, where a bad guess is so disastrous that tax advisers
shrink from challenging an interpretation by the Internal Revenue
Service no matter how erroneous they think it is.
The reason Kintner attracted almost no passengers, in my
opinion, is that its seaworthiness was suspect from the outset. The
district court held in that case that the medical clinic of which
Kintner was an associate "fully" met the llfo".,issey criteria of
centralized management and continuity of life, that it scored some-
where between a partnership and a corporation as to transfer-
ability of interests, and that it closely resembled a partnership in
that the liability of its associates was not limited.~ In finding that
the association enjoyed continuity of life despite the death or with-
drawal of a member, a point that it characterized as "most de-
cisive," the district court accepted at face value the statement in
the articles that" [n] either the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retire-
ment, resignation or expulsion of a :Member shall cause a dissolu-
tion of the Association," although this provision was inconsistent
with section 31 of the Uniform Partnership Act, in force in
Montana for the taxable year before the court. (The taxpayer's
brief, indeed, conceded the applicability of partnership law to the
association: "In the instant case, we deal with a partnership, and
the members could not limit their personal liability as a matter of
state law if they so desired.") 23 Nothing in the opinion holds, or
even suggests, that any member who desired to cause a dissolution
of the association could not do so. This action would be a breach of
o
22 The district court's opinion, 107 F. Supp 976 (D. Mont. 1952), whicl1 is mora
explicit than the appellate court's, seems to have been fully endorsed on app~. The
Kintner clinic's articles of association are reprinted in MODEllu LEGAL FotnlS § 6462
(Supp. 1967).
The court's uncertainty on the transferability point is surprising, sinco tho articles of
association provided that "[t]he interest of ll. Member as ll. Member of tho Associntion
shall be non-assignable," a prohibition that was not reJmo:ed c'I'en to permit the trnnsfcr
of a deceased or xetired member's interest tQ another member. On droth, xetirement,
withdrawal or expulsion, a member was entitled under tho article3 to xecoivo certain
retirement and death benefits, but nothing else; thus, he could not transfer an interest
in the profits of the firm. On the death of the last survivor of the original members,
however, the association was tQ terminate; at that time, or on an earlier termination by
a tlu"ee-fourths vote of its Senior Members, the assets were to be divided among its then
members. The consequences of a. purported assignment of tllis interest were unclear. Per-
haps itwould xesult in a forfeiture of the member's interest on the theorj' that itwns tanta-
mount ro a withdra.wal; on the other hand, choses in nction having been assignnble for SllV'
eral centuries, perhaps it would confer on the transferee rights similnr to thOSll created by
an attempted assignment of an interest in a partnership.
28 Brief for Taxpayer at 17.
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contract, to be sure, for which the member would be liable for any
damages that could be proved; but in this respect, the Kintner
agreement did not differ from the agreements that govern many
large partnerships. By contrast, a corporate charter effectively
prevents a shareholder from causing the organization's dissolu-
tion.
The district court's determination that the Kintner association
was governed by "centralized management through representa-
tives of the members" was equally unpersuasive. Here again, un-
less Montana law was idiosyncratic in some respect not explained
in the opinion, the Uniform Partnership Act nullified the effort of
the members to achieve centralized management and its concomit-
ant, a denial of any member's authority to bind the association ex-
cept when empowered to do so by an elected executive committee.
Under section 9 of the Uniform Partnership Act, any partner has
the power to bind the partnership by any act apparently carrying
on its business in the usual way, unless his lack of authority is
known to the person with whom he is dealing. A partner's aotion
in violation of the clinic's rules would have been a breach of the
agreement, having internal consequences, but in this respect-as
with the procedure for electing a managing group-the clinic's
management was no more centralized than that of many, if not
most, large partnerships.
Two other aspects of Kintner reduced its usefulness as a pre-
cedent for other taxpayers. On appeal, the government's brief re-
lied almost exclusively on Montana's prohibition of the corporate
practice of medicine to support its contention that the Kintner
clinic was not a corporation within the meaning of section 7701
(a)(3) :
Granting as the court below held that the Association was endowed
with more of the formal attributes of a corporation than of a partner-
ship, it cannot be regarded for tax purposes as if it were a corporation
because the activity in which it purported to engage-the practice of
medicine-was not one which could lawfully be curried on by an arti-
ficial corporate entity. The federal taxing statute, while not to be
circumscribed by local law definitions of partnerships and corporations,
does not treat as a corporation an unincorporated organization which
is prohibited from incorporating.24
24 Brief for United States at 9.
The same heavy emphasis on a single issue occurred in Foremnn v. United States,
232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964):
The government's contention centers largely upon the premise that since physicians
cannot legally form a corporation for the practice of medicine in the State of
Florida, that therefore, regardless of whatever other testa the association might
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Since this contention virtually invited the taxpayer's counterclaim
that the government was trying to repudiate the statement in the
regulations that "local law is of no importance," it is perhaps
understandable that the government's brief refrained from pushing
a second argument that would have called forth the same response,
viz., that the clinic's alleged corporate characteristics lacked under
local law the effectiveness claimed for them by its articles of as-
sociation. A careful practitioner, however, would surely have been
disturbed by that argument's brooding presence, especinlly if he
thought that local law was excessively denigrated by the pre-1960
regulations.25 A second point to be noted in evaluating Kintner
as a precedent is the court's finding of business purpose for the
form chosen:
That for many years prior to the 30th day of June, 1948, the Western
Montana Clinic was a partnership composed of doctors practicing their
profession in 1\Iissoula, 1\fontana. That as the Clinic grew in size,
the management became cumbersome because of the necessity for the
consent of the partners to various details of the management and
business of the clinic, and that likewise the continuity of the partner-
ship organization was constantly interrupted by the death or resigna-
tion of old members and the addition of new ones. In addition to the
normal problems attendant upon the frequent dissolution and re-
organization of the partnership, difficulty was experienced by the Clinic
in attracting young men to the group as the capital contributions re-
quired to purchase interests in the partnership became increasingly
larger, and the financial stability of the partnership was rendered
uncertain by the possibility of the death or retirement of partners who
had substantial ownership in the partnership property.
For the purpose of minimizing the problems mentioned in the pre-
ceding paragraph, the partners of the Western Montana Clinic, on
June 30, 1948, organized the Western l\fontana Clinic, and Association,
by the adoption and execution of Articles of Association ....~a
Absent this history, which was elaborated by detailed testimony,
the provisions of the articles of association to which the district
meet, the association could never have the requisite Bubstnntill1 resemblanco to n
corporation under the Federal Statute.
ld. at 136.
25 See note 15 8'Upra.
26 Findings of Fact, Record at 73-74. The court also found among othllr things:
Since its organization the Western Montann Clinic hn.s operated in conformity
to its Articles of Association and pursuant to tho Articles of Associntion (Article
VI), the major affairs of the Clinic have been managed by an Exe~utivoCommittee
composed of less than the whole clinic membership, whilo tho officers chosen by the
Executive Committee have handled the minor details of mnnngement. Chnngll3 in
membership have occurred without disrupting tho contiuuity of the Associntion
in aeeordance with the Articles of Association.
ld. at 75-76.
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court pointed in deciding that the clinic resembled a corporation
might have been dismissed as window-dressing. To the discriminat-
ing tax adviser, in short, Kintner simply did not emit the odor of
sanctity when it first appeared in the law reports.
Another curious aspect of the belated enthusiasm engendered by
Kintner is the impact the decision would have had, if whole-
heartedly accepted, on many professional organizations that were
not seeking corporate classification. If the governing rules of the
Kintner clinic were sufficient, regardless of their effect under state
law, to require its classification as an association under section
7701(a)(3), many law firms and other professional groups with
similar provisions for a management committee and continued
existence would be equally entitled to-or saddled with-corporate
tax status. An examination of any form book will uncover pro-
visions for centralized management and continuity of life, resemb-
ling those in the Kintner agreement, that are offered to the country
lawyer as suitable for inclusion in partnership agreements.27 If
Kintner is to be believed, a lot of unpaid corporate income taxes
are waiting patiently to be assessed against organizations using
these common forms.
Of course, if the Treasury had acquiesced in Kintner despite its
unsatisfactory analysis of the issues, there would have been a wave
of Kintner-style professional organizations; but in modeling their
agreements on Kintner, they would have been relying not on the
persuasiveness of the decision, but on the complacence of the
government.
In these comments on the arguments for classifying professional
service organizations as corporations, I have not addressed myself
directly to whether these groups satisfy the criteria of the Mor-
rissey case and the regulations. On this ultimate issue, I set out my
views at length in 1961, and I have not been persuaded either by
the contrary opinions expressed by others or by the wisdom that is
said to come with age to modify my conclusion that "the state
legislation under review ... combines the award of a label with a
bit of nibbling away at the fringes of partnership law." 28 On re-
27 See Scallen at 687 n.406: "Almost any so-called corporate characteristie-centralized
management, transferability of shares, division of profits with preferences to certain
owners for income or assets in liquidation, etc.-can be imparted to a partnership by
agreement. "
28 Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taa:ation-: Some Questions
aM Comments, 17 TAX L. REV. 1, 30 (1961). Others have, wittingly or unmttingly, mado
the same point. For example:
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viewing the arguments that have been adduced by others for treat-
ing new-style professional organizations as corporations, I would
now add that the proferred theories-which vary greatly from one
proponent to another-require drastic revisions in the process of
classifying offbeat organizations. These novel approaches differ
so much in their impact on professional groups, as well on the
status of other types of business organizations, as to constitute an
admission-unmistakeable even though implicit-that the case for
corporate treatment is quite weak, and that it requires support
from new and untested modes of defining "association."
Question: ••• If we incorporate la'IVYers are we not going to molle it that much
more difficult to stop 1llllluthorized practice in the wrong nrros'l
Armstrong: I think it does make the position that we have consistently tollen, that
lay corporations should not engage in the praetice of law, more difficult in Eccing
that our own corporations nre under proper safegunrds. There is 11 distinction, how-
ever, "because O'ILTS [i.e., a professional corporation] is flOt G corporation creept, we
hope, for taz purposes. It does not have the powers and it has n. great many more
restrictions than an ordinary corporation would have ••••
(Panel discussion, Professional Associntions: Substance, Ethics and Tn:w.tion, 1DG~ ABA
Section of Real Property Probate 8; Trust Law, Proceedings, Part I, p. ~G, at 32 (em·
phasis added).
See also id. at 28:
Hannaford: The professional corporation or association statutes that have been
passed in twenty states have been called b~· man)" people a tax gimmick. The histOr)'
of this will show why I do not consider it a tax gimmick, at least as far as a large
segment Of the medical profession is concerncd. (Emphasis added.)
(Opinions obviously can differ on the meaning of "lnrge segment," see note 13 Sllpra.)
As the problem is viewed by Snyder and Weckstein: "a professional practitioner requires
a special kind of employer, an evanescent one, who is there for tax purposes but dis·
appears when professional services nre rendered and earnings nre distributed." Snyder
& Weckstein, Quasi-Corporations, Quasi-Employees, and Quasi-Taz Belief for Profes·
sional Persons, 48 CoRNELL L.Q. 613, 615 (1963). Sca also debate in ABA. House of
Delegates (Honolulu, 1967), on continuation of the Special Committee on Profe"sionnl
Corporations, in which the secretary of the committee responded to critics as follows:
If somebody doesn't like the word "eorporations," even though everybody who
has anything to do or say in that corporation has to be a lawyer and only lawyers
may operate their structure, and when they do it, oelicte me it would oe no different
than that which goes on in mOllt of the partnerships of any substantial size, but if
people don't like the "\Vord "corporations," there nre many of the state statutes
which don't use that term but use the term assoclntion.
Transcript at 65 (emphasis added).
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